1.2 Conditional probability and Bayes’ theorem
How much should you trust a pedestrian alarm?
What you will learn
- Explain conditional probability: the probability that B happens given that A has happened
- Explain why false alarms can outnumber real detections even with a high-performing detector
- Use Bayes’ theorem to calculate the probability that an alarm is real
Build intuition
Consider a pedestrian detector running on an in-vehicle camera, under the following conditions:
- Pedestrians appear in 0.1% of the video frames recorded while driving
- When a pedestrian is present, the detector raises an alarm 99% of the time
- When no pedestrian is present, it still raises a false alarm 1% of the time
So when the alarm goes off, how likely is it that a pedestrian is really there? It is tempting to say 99%, but the actual answer is about 9%.
Probabilities are hard to picture, so let us count using 100,000 frames.
- Pedestrian present: 100,000 × 0.1% = 100 frames → alarms in 99% of them: 99 alarms
- No pedestrian: 99,900 frames → false alarms in 1% of them: 999 alarms
That makes 1,098 alarms in total — and only 99 of them are real.
The key point is that scenes with pedestrians are rare in the first place (0.1%). When you search for rare events, even a small false-alarm rate is multiplied by the huge number of ordinary cases, so false alarms end up outnumbering the real ones.
Check with math
The probability that B happens given that A has happened is written \(P(B \mid A)\) and is called a conditional probability.
Let \(H\) = “a pedestrian is present” and \(A\) = “the alarm goes off”. We want \(P(H \mid A)\), but what we know is the reverse, \(P(A \mid H)\). Bayes’ theorem is the tool that flips this direction.
Plugging in the numbers gives the same result as counting 100,000 frames.
\(P(H)\) is called the prior probability (your belief before seeing any data), and \(P(H \mid A)\) the posterior probability (your belief after seeing the evidence — the alarm).
Advanced: how much evidence is a passed test?
Bayes’ theorem applies not only to alarms but also to the evidence “the test was passed”. Suppose a function either meets its requirement (the safe case) or in fact does not (the unsafe case), and that even in the unsafe case a single test passes 90% of the time (a miss rate ten times the requirement is not visible in one trial). In the safe case the pass rate is 99%. When n tests in a row are passed, the ratio of how likely that result is in the safe case to how likely it is in the unsafe case is called the likelihood ratio.
For n = 10 this is about 2.6; for n = 100 about 14,000. If the belief before testing is written as the ratio “safe : unsafe” (the odds), Bayes’ theorem takes this simple form:
Starting from a rather sceptical “1 : 9”, ten passes give 1/9 × 2.6 ≈ 0.29 — a probability of about 22% for the safe case, so the unsafe case is still the more likely. Only a hundred passes push the safe case above 99.9%.
The weight of a pass is set by how well the test would catch the unsafe case (1 − 0.90). A test with few repetitions, or a lenient one that the unsafe case also passes, is weak evidence even when passed. This is the same idea as the “power to find a difference” (statistical power in 1.7), and the foundation for comparing the strength of evidence in a safety case (5.10).
Connection to automated driving
- Unnecessary hard braking: systems that detect rare events, such as a pedestrian suddenly stepping into the road, are structurally prone to false alarms (false activations). Hard braking triggered by a false activation can cause rear-end collisions, so SOTIF also treats “reacting too much” as a source of hazards.
- Choosing performance metrics: “detects 99% of pedestrians” (recall) is not enough. You also need to know what percentage of alarms are real (precision). → 2.7 Evaluation metrics
- The meaning depends on where you drive: even with the same detector, \(P(H)\) differs between a busy urban area and a highway, so the reliability of an alarm changes too. → 4.1 ODD, Quiz Q2
Summary
- \(P(B \mid A)\) is “the share of B within the world where A has happened”
- Bayes’ theorem flips \(P(A \mid H)\) into \(P(H \mid A)\)
- When detecting rare events, a low prior probability leads to many false alarms
Quick quiz
Q1. If the false-alarm rate drops from 1% to 0.1%, what is the probability that an alarm is real?
About 50%. Counting 100,000 frames, there are 99,900 × 0.1% ≈ 100 false alarms and 99 real ones, so 99 ÷ (99 + 100) ≈ 0.50. Even with the false-alarm rate cut to one tenth, half of the alarms are still false.
Q2. What if the same detector (99% detection, 1% false alarms) is used in an urban area where pedestrians appear in 10% of frames?
About 92%. Of 100,000 frames, 10,000 contain pedestrians → 9,900 detections; 90,000 do not → 900 false alarms. 9,900 ÷ 10,800 ≈ 0.92. The detector is the same, but the meaning of its output changes greatly with the operating environment (ODD).
Further reading
- Next lesson: 1.3 Probability distributions
- Related: 2.7 Evaluation metrics, 5.3 Functional insufficiencies and triggering conditions
- Exercise: a Colab notebook for trying different numbers (coming soon)
- Video lecture: YouTube (about 4 minutes) (the key points explained with slides and narration; the Japanese article has a Japanese video)
- Related: 1.8 Statistics of rare events — the “counting” side of rare events