Local governments have each local identities. So local government is under the decision making for a regional
planning.
We understand that decision making to apply some financial supporting system to some planning region is observed to behavior between cetral and local government as a game theory.
So, this our issue as play the business game between central and local government is whether available using a financial supporting system for developing region or not to using that.
Now , we have two subjects (players) of decision making which are cetral government and local government of developing region. And they will have each two strategies which are composed of "positive" and "negative".
that is
MatrixA
| positive | negative | ||
| positive | 100, 100 | 30, 60 | |
| negative | 40, 40 | 60, 60 |
and another example is,
MatrixB
| positive | negative | ||
| positive | 100, 100 | 30, 60 | |
| negative | 110, 40 | 60, 60 |
MatrixA has a equilibrium which I have marked 100,100.
MatrixB has a equilibrium which I have marked 60, 60.
We can make some game trees from the combination of A & B matrix and sequence of player.
type 1 is MatrixA and the first move of central government
type 2 is MatrixB and the first move of central government
type 3 is MatrixA and the first move of local government
type 4 is MatrixB and the first move of local government
then
type 1 is cooperatinal
type 2 is confrontational
type 3 is conpetitional-1
type 4 is conpetitional-2
This is a normative discussion. And in the actual condition, we observe cooperational attitude between central and local government in frequently. These activities are profesional commonsence in the present situation of the political system in Japan.